INTRODUCTION
Transitional justice is usually addressed through institutional processes such as lustration, restitution, prosecution and "truth commissions", around which a comprehensive academic literature has developed. However, this chapter explores a relatively neglected symbolic dimension of transitional justice 1 , namely practices of memorialization and commemoration that are represented, played out and contested in urban space. There is widespread acknowledgment within the transitional justice literature that memorialization -in the form of monuments, statues and museums -has a key role to play in healing the wounds of the communist past. Such memorials "represent a critical terrain where the past is confronted and conflict can be addressed" 2 . Memorialization is a means of giving recognition to those who suffered hardship, repression, exile or death under Communist regimes. The practice makes a visible statement about what (and who) a political order considers worthy of remembrance and is a means of reaching large numbers of people over an extended period of time.
In this chapter we focus on the various ways in which transitional justice for the victims of Communist regimes is expressed in the highly complex entanglement of urban cultural landscapes, public memory, and commemorative sites and practices. We contend that attempts to shape public memory through practices of commemoration and memorialization are important (if neglected) aspects of transitional justice, that have much to tell us about how post-communist societies choose to remember -and forget -the period of Communist Party rule. Following a review of the relationships between public memory and urban space we begin by examining efforts to erase the commemorative landscape produced by communist regimes. We then look at the variety of initiatives (by diverse elites and publics) to commemorate the victims of Communist regimes, with particular reference to monuments, memorials and museums. We also highlight the importance of both domestic and international tourism to these sites of memory as central to the way in which they 'work'.
PUBLIC MEMORY, COMMEMORATION AND URBAN SPACE
Public memory can be defined as "a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society understand both its past, present, and by implication, its future" 3 . It is a society's collective understanding of the past, but also the ways that this past is represented in the present. 4 Since memory is integral to the formation of identities 5 , collective (or public) memory has long been important in the construction of collective identities. In particular, nation-states construct and promote a particular understanding of the past within nationbuilding projects that are intended to foster social cohesion and a sense of allegiance to a particular 'imagined community'. 6 The formation of such a collective memory involves choices about what a society wishes to remember. Nevertheless, while states may play a leading role in the construction of collective memory they do not enjoy a monopoly over this process. Instead various elites and publics both within and without the state (each of which may be fractured by competing and contesting agendas) participate in the process 7 so that the formation of public memory is a fluid process of negotiation. 8 Public memory "emerges from the intersection of official and vernacular cultural expressions" 9 and, for this reason, it is best regarded as an activity or process, rather than an outcome. 10 An important aspect of public memory which is central to our argument in this chapter is that it is a process which is worked out in the public arena. This is achieved through various practices of remembrance and commemoration intended to reify public memory by turning it into visual spectacle. In particular, human geographers argue that urban space -or landscape -is essential to the 'working' of public memory. 11 All political orders seek to create an 'official public landscape' 12 which is intended as a rhetorical statement of specific political values. Remembrance and commemoration are central aspects of such landscapes: indeed, Edensor 13 has coined the term 'memoryscape' for those parts of the urban landscape that are given over to collective remembrance. The urban environment can be the setting for a range of temporary (if cyclical) commemorative practices including ceremonies, parades, festivals and rituals. However, most forms of commemoration are permanent and include a range of statues, monuments, memorials and other public buildings, along with commemorative names attached to streets, buildings and other urban landmarks. Such commemorative practices concretise 'official' conceptions of public memory, rendering it seemingly immutable in the public arena. They can, however, also be sites for the expression of opposition to, and contestation of, this official public memory.
Since public memory is produced in a particular political context it is vulnerable to any process of political change. In particular, all shifts of political power "generate a reconfiguration of the "known past"". 14 This issue is of particular relevance in postcommunist societies which have sought to build political identities based on an emphatic rejection of communism (a strategy which generally enjoyed widespread popular support). In this context such societies faced the need for a new, appropriate and 'usable' past to replace now discredited communist-era constructions of the collective past. The most readily available model was that of the period before communist rule. 15 Thus, throughout EastCentral Europe there has been a focus on the pre-communist past as the model for a postcommunist future. As Katherine Verdery 16 has argued, this is about effectively excising the communist period from the historical time line (and, initially, denying that it ever happened) and returning to the period before the Second World War; it suggests that history is able to resume the authentic trajectory it would have taken, had it not been for the 'aberration' of four decades of communist party rule. Clearly in post-communist contexts, the past is something that is fluid and flexible, with different state and non-state groups competing to establish a new historical narrative.
Similarly, public memory is also in a state of reformation. 17 Within the political transformation from totalitarianism to democracy, post-communist societies face new choices about what (and who) they want to remember, and how (and where) this remembrance will be enacted. At the same time as seeking to forget communism, the new societies will want to remember the repression and violence of the former regime, and to honour the victims of state persecution. There may also be a desire to remember the events that brought about the collapse of Communist regimes (even if, in some cases, these events did not in themselves bring about a clear break with those regimes). Moreover, given that the urban landscape is central to the expression of public memory these debates will, in some way, be worked out in urban space. In particular there will be a significant remaking of the commemorative landscape. People and events that were honoured by the previous regime will be decommemorated and their memorials removed from the public arena. New acts of commemoration will subsequently follow in a way that accords with the political values and public memory of the new regime.
In this way, practices of commemoration and memorialization within the urban landscape can be important (if often overlooked) elements of transitional justice projects in post-communist states. Indeed, memorialization and collective remembrance are fundamental processes in societies recovering from traumatic pasts. 18 Barsalou and Baxter 19 argue that memorialization has a number of roles in such projects: it offers symbolic reparations to the victims of violence; it can promote reconciliation; it can encourage engagement with education programmes about the recent past; and it creates specific sites that can be the focus both of individual mourning and official ceremonies of remembrance. Of particular relevance to our argument in this chapter, is that memorialization makes a highly visible statement in the public arena about a post-communist society's commitment to a new set of political values. In fact, of all the forms of transitional justice, memorialisation is probably the most visible and has the potential to have an impact on the everyday lives of the greatest number of people.
Yet, to date, there has been only sporadic attention in the transitional justice literature to the role of memorialization projects within the urban landscape. This reflects a broader context in which political scientists have paid relatively little attention to the role of monuments and memorials as political symbols. 20 In the following sections we explore changing practices of memorialization in post-communist East-Central Europe, focussing firstly on the removal of the commemorative landscapes created by communist regimes, and secondly, on the efforts to create new memorial sites and landscapes within transitional justice projects.
ERASING THE COMMEMORATIVE LANDSCAPE OF COMMUNISM
When Communist Party regimes came to power in the late 1940s they immediately set about remaking public memory. This was principally achieved through a comprehensive rewriting of history and total control over the education system. It also included a comprehensive remaking of the urban landscape to decommemorate the historical narrative associated with the now-discredited former regime. Since communist regimes attached especial importance to the transformative power of public space for creating a new socialist consciousness 21 the public arena effectively became an instrument of state propaganda. An entirely new commemorative landscape was produced which was saturated with a variety of symbols (including statues, memorials, monuments, plaques, murals, banners, and slogans) 22 that were intended to shape the ways that people thought about their individual and collective pasts.
As communist regimes in East-Central Europe started to collapse in 1989 their official commemorative landscapes swiftly became the targets of protest, resulting in the familiar process of 'landscape cleansing'. 23 This activity was initiated by the populace during the euphoria that accompanied the collapse of Communist Party rule and continued by the new post-communist administrations. This process satisfied the demand to see evidence of political change. 24 Czepczyński 25 identifies a number of strategies for landscape cleansing:
removal, renaming, rededication and reuse. The most visible strategy is removal, where monuments placed by the communist states were directly expunged from the urban arena. By far the most iconic images of the collapse of communist regimes were the removal of statues of Soviet figures such as Lenin. These events required considerable organisation and resources, and so were usually orchestrated by the state. 26 They provided a dramatic and highly visible proclamation that political order was changing. However, in most cases the eradication of communist statuary was both less spectacular and less immediate, with most removals taking place quietly during the early years of the post-communist period. 27 Only in a few instances were communist monuments destroyed in situ: the dynamiting of Georgi Dimitrov's mausoleum in Sofia in 1999 was the best example. 28 However, in most instances communist monuments and statues were not destroyed but A less dramatic strategy was the renaming of streets, buildings and other urban landmarks to de-commemorate events and personalities from communist-era historiography. This practice has been termed "toponymic cleansing". 31 Such renaming is "an act of political propaganda with immense proclamative value and public resonance" 32 : it makes an immediate statement that public memory is changing, and is relatively quick and simple to implement. Renaming was intended to decommemorate the communist past and also to 'place' a new narrative of national history and memory into public space. However, renaming urban streets and buildings was relatively limited in scale and was most prominent in the central areas of towns and cities. Since many toponyms allocated during the communist era had no ideological connotations they did not need to be renamed. So, for example, in Bucharest only 6.6% of the city's streets were renamed after 1989 33 and in other post-communist cities the proportion was lower.
Strategies of rededication and reuse were applied mostly to museums. Communist regimes attached considerable importance to museums 34 Overall, then, the efforts to neutralise the commemorative symbols of communism (and the public memory that they represented) was a crude first step in achieving redress for the abuses and hardship of the communist era. However, the process of landscape cleansing was always partial. It was applied most thoroughly to the central parts of cities (particularly capitals) and to a lesser extent (and sometimes hardly at all) in more peripheral districts. Its target was the most visible and iconic symbols of the communist regime, while smaller or more inconspicuous symbols were often ignored or overlooked. Removing or reconfiguring the commemorative landscape of communism effectively cleared space in the urban arena for an entirely new set of commemorative practices that were specifically intended to remember the victims and abuses of communism. These are discussed in the following section
COMMEMORATING THE VICTIMS OF, AND RESISTANCE TO, COMMUNIST

REGIMES
Within strategies to redefine public memory there have been two broad strands to the remaking of commemorative landscapes. First, in the effort to (re)establish a 'normal' past post-socialist societies have attempted to correct the distortions of communist-era historiography. In addition to de-commemorating key figures from the communist version of history there has been a focus on reinstating and re-commemorating those people (such as politicians and monarchs) who were excised from public memory by communist historians.
This, in turn, resulted in new practices of memorialisation in the public arena and, once the official public landscape had been de-communised, it could be repopulated with new monuments, statues, memorials and toponyms. The most straightforward way to do this was by returning streets to their pre-communist commemorative names. For example, in central 40 Civil society groups and non-governmental organisations have also been active in memorialising the communist past, particularly in those countries where former communist officials have remained in power and have been more unwilling to condemn the communist era. 41 In addition, ordinary individuals can also be involved in the process of remembrance through creating and placing their own, informal memorials in the urban landscape. The commemorative landscape is therefore characterised by a bricolage of memorial forms, dedicated to different subjects and groups, in a wide range of locations, and with a wide range of sponsors. Here, we focus on two broad categories of memorialization: first, monuments and memorials, and second, museums (with associated practices of tourism)
Monuments and Memorials
For states engaged in enacting transitional justice the erection of monuments and statues in the public arena has provided one means of recognition of the injustices of the Communist 
Museums and Tourism
To fully appreciate the role of museums within transitional justice projects it is important to recognise that museums are not simply collections of objects put on public display for the education and entertainment of visitors. Instead, museums have always had a broader ideological purpose. They are a form of public culture through which political elites tell a society about itself and where it has come from. In particular, those museums that are sponsored by the state have an important role in 'telling the national story'. They are institutions that are intended to be visited by the citizenry and which have a clearly articulated educational mission. They aim to communicate a particular understanding of the past and in this context they play a significant role in the making (and remaking) of public memory. More broadly, as a means of 'staging' the nation 43 museums contribute to the formation of collective identities and their importance within nation-building projects is widely acknowledged. 44 As the earlier discussion noted, communist regimes were fully aware of the educative and propagandist role of museums in communicating their political agenda (and the associated narrative of national history) to a broad public.
In a post-communist context, museums are important 'vehicles of memory' 45 within projects to memorialize the communist past. In particular, museums can tell the story of the oppression, human rights abuses and suffering inflicted by Communist Party regimes. This, obviously, is a story that has not been formally told before (since it was not something that communist regimes were likely to draw attention to). Moreover, museums can interpret the communist period from the perspective of the people who lived through it. This is a bottomup narrative of history that focuses on everyday lives of ordinary people, rather than the macro-political agenda of the communist state and its leading political party. Memorial museums also interpret communist rule for future generations who did not experience it themselves in order to help them understand the experiences that shaped their parents' and grandparents' generation. Museums can also be locations for ceremonies and rituals intended to commemorate the victims of communist rule. Overall, memorial museums that are established as part of transitional justice projects are institutions intended to encourage remembrance, reflection and civic engagement. 46 But they are not just about the communist past: museums can also be used to make an unambiguous statement about a state's postcommunist political identity and aspirations. In this context they are sites for "performances of democracy, not static representations of national identity". 47 The use of museums in this way is, of course, as equally ideological as anything seen during the communist period, but now for entirely different ends.
What is important -but frequently overlooked -is the role of tourism in this process.
Memorial museums are intended to be visited (and as such they function as visitor 'attractions' even if their subject matter is far from attractive). Some of the visitors to memorial museums will be children and young people, studying the communist period as part of their educational curriculum. However, most people will be visiting during their leisure time. Furthermore many of these people will be tourists (conventionally defined as people staying away from their home area for at least 24 hours) who can be both domestic (citizens of a country travelling within that country) and international (visitors from other countries).
Although political scientists may be inclined to dismiss tourism as rather trivial and with little to offer in understanding politics, there is growing interest within the discipline of tourism studies in the ways that tourism can contribute to broader political projects and objectives. 48 For example, visiting historic buildings and monuments is a means of 'connecting' with the broader community of the nation 49 and as such tourism can be identified as one form of banal nationalism. 50 Tourism can also be used to project political identities to an external audience.
For example, a number of recent studies have explored how the Central and Eastern European countries have used their state-sponsored tourism promotional materials to project a distinctly post-communist political identity to the wider world. 51 In the context of transitional justice projects, tourists can be encouraged to visit particular places (such as museums) in order to purposefully communicate to them a message about the communist past and the post-communist future. Moreover, many of these people will be heritage tourists who are interested in, and receptive to, learning during their leisure time 52 .
For domestic tourists, the visit to a memorial museum performs the same role as other consumers who are incapable of fully appreciating the significance of the story presented to them and, at worst, as shallow thrill-seekers who are motivated by "a morbid and senseless curiosity". 57 However, recent research within the disciplines of tourism studies and anthropology has demonstrated that the behaviour of visitors to memorial places is far more purposeful and significant than is often appreciated, and that visitors can be engaged in highly meaningful acts of remembrance and engagement with the subject matter they encounter. 58 Other authors 59 accept that visits to memorial museums may be associated with short term learning, understanding and changed attitudes but they question the longer-term impacts of such visits in bringing about deeper learning and a broader engagement with the issues of transitional justice. Overall, then, the 'consumption' of memorial museums by their visitors is clearly a subject which merits much fuller research.
CONCLUSIONS
Issues of memorialisation and the reformulation of public memory are often considered to be 'soft' aspects of transitional justice and consequently they have not received as much academic attention as the 'hard' politics of truth commissions, lustration or restitution.
However we argue that the issue of shaping public memory through commemorative practices and landscapes is an integral element of transitional justice projects which merits much fuller investigation. In concluding we highlight the importance of considering the cultural politics of transitional justice and we identify the lessons of accepting such a perspective.
One overall lesson that emerges from considering public memory and its expression in the urban landscape is that transitional justice is not only played out in the spaces of courtrooms, legislatures and administrations. It is also worked out in public squares, memorial landscapes and museum. Indeed, we need to recognise the vast range of sites and spaces in which multiple practices of transitional justice 'works', through the initiatives of both elites and publics. In this context it is important to acknowledge that the past itself (and that ways that it long-term form of transitional justice which persists in public space for decades to come then it will require careful consideration and management.
The final lesson from our chapter that follows on from the points above is that there is a need to explore public reception of landscapes and memorialisation. This is the area in which the literature is most weakly developed. As Barsalou and Baxter suggest, "the impact of all transitional justice processes -memorialisation among them -remains under-researched." 60 They note the difficulty in determining what memorialisation actually contributes to reconciliation and justice. Thus we need to explore questions such as how do people relate to memorials and landscapes linked to transitional justice projects in their everyday lives? Do memorials work effectively as vehicles of transitional justice? Are they sites of remembrance or contestation, or do they simply become a backdrop to the everyday use of space in the city?
Are they even regarded with apathy or simply ignored? Again, these issues have temporal and generational dimensions and will vary across multiple publics and elites. For example, some authors are sceptical about the long-term impact of museums on the public consciousness. 61 Furthermore, as Clark suggests, there is a danger that too much memorialisation may inhibit societies' ability to move on. 62 Moreover 
